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Abstract—Cryptocurrencies are rapidly finding wide applica-
tion in areas such as Real Time Gross Settlements and Payments
Systems. Ripple is a cryptocurrency that has gained prominence
with banks and payment providers. It solves the Byzantine
General’s Problem with it’s Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm
(RPCA), where each server maintains a list of servers, called
Unique Node List (UNL) that represents the network for the
server, and will not collectively defraud it. The server believes
that the network has come to a consensus when members of the
UNL come to a consensus on a transaction.
In this paper we improve Ripple to achieve better speed,
security, last mile connectivity and ease of use. We implement
guidelines and automated systems for building and maintaining
UNLs for resilience, robustness, improved security, and efficient
information propagation. We enhance the system so as to ensure
that each server receives information from across the whole
network rather than just from the UNL members. We also
introduce the paradigm of UNL overlap as a function of in-
formation propagation and the trust a server assigns to its own
UNL. Our design not only reduces vulnerabilities such as eclipse
attacks, but also makes it easier to identify malicious behaviour
and entities attempting to fraudulently Double Spend or stall
the system. We provide experimental evidence of the benefits
of our approach over the current Ripple scheme. We observe
≥ 4.97x and 98.22x in speedup and success rate for information
propagation respectively, and ≥ 3.16x and 51.70x in speedup
and success rate in consensus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies are digital assets designed to work as a
medium of exchange, and as virtual or alternate currencies.
Generally implemented as distributed systems, they utilize
blockchain technology and public key cryptography to ensure
that the same resource is not fraudulently pledged to more
than one entity (popularly known as the Double Spending
Problem). While public key cryptography prevents tampering
of transactions, blockchain technology ensures that the chain
of previous transactions becomes increasingly resistant to mod-
ification as new transactions get added to it. Cryptocurrencies
have increasingly gained popularity and find utility in a variety
of areas including Real Time Gross Settlements (RTGSs) and
Payment Systems. Bitcoin [19], Ethereum [28], Ripple [22],
Tether [25], Libra [3], LiteCoin [1] and Monero [7][18] are
some popular cryptocurrencies.
Unfortunately implementing cryptocurrencies as distributed
systems also brings in some challenges associated with achiev-
ing fast, secure and correct agreement on the validity of
transactions (consensus) in the presence of connection ineffi-
ciencies and malicious actors. Various cryptocurrencies attempt
to solve this problem using different approaches including
Proof-of-Work [19][28], Proof-of-Stake [5], Proof-of-Elapsed-
Time [20], Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [3] and Proof-
Of-Authority. However, several challenges could potentially
open the system to the Byzantine General’s Problem [15] and
result in attacks like Double Spending causing a blockchain
fork, delay, or prevent the progress of the chain. These
challenges can arise due to malicious or benign network issues
like downtime and increased connection latencies. Additionally
malicious nodes could throttle or manipulate information flow,
or selectively share erroneous information. These negate the
benefits of using blockchain technology.
For a cryptocurrency to be successful and widely adopted,
one must have an efficient solution to the blockchain chal-
lenges and have in place a fast, reliable, highly secure, and
resilient system. Such a system should also be designed to
achieve last mile connectivity, and make it easy to detect
malicious entities. Its servers should be easy to set up and
run. For achieving these we look at one such representative
cryptocurrency, Ripple [13][22] that has increasingly gained
popularity with banks and payment providers and has been
working in compliance with financial regulators. Ripple pro-
vides a network to seamlessly transfer value across the world
in a few seconds in a manner significantly faster and more
energy efficient than Bitcoin. With these benefits, regulatory
compliance and it’s efforts to integrate with the world’s finan-
cial institutions, Ripple is a promising cryptocurrency for the
future of financial systems.
Ripple solves the Byzantine General’s Problem using its
Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm (RPCA) [22]. Each
server running the RPCA maintains it’s own Unique Node
List (UNL), a key element of the RPCA. A server’s UNL
is a list of servers which it believes will not collectively
defraud it, and which in a way acts as a representative of the
whole network. In order to ensure the correctness of consensus
and to prevent network partitions and blockchain forks, the
server’s administrators are expected to configure and maintain
the UNL such that there is always a minimum overlap between
the UNLs of their server and any other server. The server
believes that the network has reached consensus on the various
transactions received when the votes (proposals) received from
servers on its UNL crosses a certain threshold. This threshold
is a function of the minimum overlap between each server’s
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UNL [2].
Limitations of Ripple: Currently, Ripple has certain technical
challenges that if improved upon can create a more ideal
environment for crypto-currencies. (1) There are no guidelines,
mechanisms or any guaranteed fool-proof way of ensuring the
minimum required overlap between UNLs. (2) The minimum
overlap can be increased without affecting the security and
performance of the system, thereby reducing consensus thresh-
olds and achieving consensus sooner. (3) The relatively slow
rate of information propagation affects the rate of convergence
to a consensus and can possibly be exploited. Information
propagation can be improved upon and be made more robust,
resilient and efficient. (4) There is no way to ensure that a
server receives transactions from all across the network, let
alone in an optimum way. Connectivity (including last mile
connectivity) and exposure to the whole network in the face
of network issues and malicious behaviour is not assured.
(5) The set-up and maintenance of the UNL is a manual
process. The system lacks real time UNL updation. Finally,
(6) in the current version of RPCA, a transaction that is set to
undergo consensus (candidate transaction) propagates across
the immediate neighborhood of a node that has the transaction
(across its UNL). This can cause a delay of several consensus
rounds for the transaction to reach the whole network.
Our Contributions: These issues can potentially compromise
security, correctness of consensus, affect the rate and quality of
information propagation, and rate and quality of convergence
to a consensus in the face of churn, attacks, network issues and
other blockchain challenges. The manual element can make
the system prone to human error and also decrease the ease of
use of running a server. In this paper we present approaches
to solve the above challenges to bring about an increase in
the speed, security, last mile connectivity and ease of use
for Ripple. We do so by (1) applying a modified consensus
algorithm, and (2) implementing guidelines for UNLs and
(3) mechanisms to set-up and dynamically maintain UNLs
for greater security, resilience, high availability and ease of
use, and (4) the concept of UNL overlap as a function of
information propagation and reputation/ trust value of a node’s
UNL. This results in fast, efficient, reliable, highly secure and
resilient and assured information propagation, quality UNL
overlap and consensus.
In our modified consensus algorithm, we make information
(proposal and candidate set) propagation push based via direct
and indirect routes with flow happening beyond immediate
neighbours. This is a change over Ripple’s pull based direct
propagation for candidate sets [22] and push based direct
propagation for proposals [12] with information fetch and push
happening across immediate neighbours. This helps ensure
information is propagated across the whole network faster
and in much lesser consensus rounds, thereby improving
performance, security and resilience. It ensures communication
indirectly through the network in the case of failure of direct
communication between two nodes. Additionally, it ensures
visibility of information circulating in the network, preventing
the harmful effects of some malicious behaviour while making
it easier to identify malicious entities.
We introduce guidelines for the UNL, with UNL member-
ship and thus message passing inspired by Distributed Hash Ta-
bles (DHTs) such as Kelips [10]. DHTs, with their associated
gossip protocols and network topologies are chosen based on
the intuition to leverage years of prior works [10][17][21][23]
in the domain of efficient information storage and retrieval
across appropriate nodes in a network. Usage of DHTs ensures
the network is interconnected, and yet randomised and generic.
Kelips helps achieve faster lookup times, O(1), through in-
creased memory and background overhead. It adapts quickly
to churn and is tolerant to failures and faults. This helps
ensure most queries are serviced quickly. We leverage Kelips’
network overlay structure, efficient query routing and the core
mechanics of query and look-up to help propagate information
efficiently (speedily, surely and at lower costs)..
We also introduce mechanisms to set up and maintain a
dynamic UNL. This involves failure detectors, tombstoning,
discovery, randomisation, introduction of new trusted lists
which also takes into consideration various attacks and algo-
rithms. We introduce two new node lists, the Trustee Node
List (TNL) and Network Members List (NML). The TNL of
a server is a list of all the other server’s that have the said
server in their UNL. The NML of the server is a list of all
servers in the network which the server is aware of and has
reasonable evidence to believe is live. The NML is used for
the purpose of maintaining a dynamic UNL that is randomised
and more resilient to table poisoning attacks. We utilise Kelips’
concept of introducers that assist us in populating the NML,
and thus the UNL, initially. Introducers are non-critical and
dispensible members that speed up the process of building the
UNL and NML, and assist in ensuring thorough coverage of
the network. The decentralised nature of the system remains
unaffected with the introduction of introducers. This is due to
the fact that the population of relevant lists can also begin with
getting information from other seed nodes.
We introduce the concept of overlap (and thus consensus
thresholds) as a function of information propagation and
reputation/ trust value of a node’s UNL. The mechanics of
information propagation and a formal listing of several possible
paths in a Kelips-like overlay is presented. With sound proofs
and backed by experimental results we prove that a node
under attack or at a last mile location, and connected with
at least one genuine node can transmit and receive all the
information within the network in not more than three hops
(3 Hop Claim). We then explain the concept of overlap
(and thus consensus thresholds) as a function of information
propagation and reputation/ trust value of a node’s UNL. The
overlap between UNLs is systematised and increased without
adversely impacting performance, whilst having a randomised
and generic network.
As a result of these modifications, information flows more
freely and propagates across the whole network backed by
efficient UNL design. The UNL design ensures that we get
sufficient overlap and receive all the information generated
across the network easily, providing each node with full
knowledge of the network, in a manner of speaking, and
thereby tackling the Byzantine General’s Problem. Our ap-
proach thus provides exposure to the entire network and it’s
information, making it easier to identify malicious nodes in the
system. Our approaches also improve speed, reduce transaction
time and thresholds for consensus, improve UNL overlap for
provable security[2], improve security, significantly reduce the
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chances of network partitioning and blockchain forks, provide
last mile connectivity, improve ease of use and bring about
other benefits. Resolve several of blockchain and Ripple’s
challenges.
To evaluate the efficacy of our proposals, we simulate and
compare across multiple systems and information propagation
modes, consensus algorithms, and maximum shortest path.
We simulate a variety of situations from network issues to
malicious nodes spread across the network, and/or eclipsing a
particular node. Basis experimental results, comparative values
upon implementing our approaches as compared to RippleNet
having random UNLs can be as good as • ≥ 4.97x speed up in
info propagation, • 98.22x success rate in information reaching
the whole network, • 0.05x average received messages in
information propagation • 0.79x average sent messages in
information propagation • ≥ 3.16x speed up in consensus
• 51.70x success rate in reaching consensus • 0.42x average
received messages in consensus • 1.41x average sent messages
in consensus, and • 419.2x rate of having number of hops ≤ 3
between source and destination
Each case where information is not propagated 100% or
consensus not reached at 100% nodes is a possibility of at-
tackers launching attacks resulting in either blockchain forks or
slowing down/ stoppage of consensus. Additionally, due to our
work one can • Reduce the minimum thresholds for consensus,
improve UNL overlap for provable security. • Significantly
reduce the chances of network partitioning and blockchain
forks. • Increase resilience to Eclipse, DDoS, table poisoning,
throttling, byzantine and other attacks. • Identification of
malicious nodes throttling information or sharing two different
versions of information becomes easier due to 100% receipt
of information. • Ensure high availability and churn resilience.
• Balance the load arriving and leaving nodes. • DHTs can
also further be utilised to have better network diagnostics with
network state, connection and latency detection which system
designers can choose to incorporate or obfuscate. • Have in
place a fast, reliable, highly secure, and resilient system. •
Provide last mile connectivity, and ease of setting-up and
running servers.
Organization: We divide this paper into 7 sections, we first
set up the background of prior works relevant to our work
– a brief description of Kelips and Ripple, it’s consensus
algorithm, relevant analysis associated with UNL overlaps and
the correctness of consensus. We then provide an overview of
related works in Section III. In Section IV, we describe our
work, guidelines and overlay structure for UNL, mechanisms
for dynamic UNL, and the modified consensus algorithm.
We describe formally analyse information propagation and
introduce the paradigm of UNL overlap as a function of
information propagation and trust value of a UNL. We provide
an approach for analysing overlap in such a case with some
other relevant arguments and information. Section V deals with
experimental work, set up, analysis and the interpretations. We
then present the areas of our future work and conclude the
paper in VI Section.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we first explain about the relevant compo-
nents in Ripple and the RPCA [22].
A. Ripple [2] [12] [14] [22]
Each server running the Ripple Server software (as op-
posed to the Ripple Client software) participates in the con-
sensus process. It maintains a partial or complete ledger which
is a record of the amount of currency in each user’s account
and represents the "ground truth" of the network. The ledger
is repeatedly updated with transactions that successfully pass
through the consensus process. The most recent ledger ratified
by the consensus process represents the current state of the
network is called the last-closed ledger.
Each server s also maintains a unique node list (UNL),
which is a set of other servers that s queries when determining
consensus. Only the votes of the other members of the UNL of
s are considered when determining consensus (as opposed to
every node on the network). The UNL represents a subset of
the network which when taken collectively, is trusted by s to
not collude in an attempt to defraud the network. Note that this
definition of trust does not require that each individual member
of the UNL be trusted. Any server can broadcast transactions to
be included in the consensus process, and every server attempts
to include every valid transaction when a new consensus round
starts. During the consensus process, however, only proposals
from servers on the UNL of a server s are considered by s.
Ripple Consensus Algorithm (RPCA) [12][22]: The Ripple
Protocol Consensus Algorithm (RPCA) is applied every few
seconds by all nodes in order to maintain the correctness and
achieve agreement / consensus in the network. Once consensus
is reached, the current ledger is considered closed and becomes
the last-closed ledger. Assuming that the consensus algorithm
is successful, and that there is no fork in the network, the last-
closed ledger maintained by all nodes in the network will be
identical. The RPCA proceeds in rounds. In each round:
1) Each server initially takes all valid transactions it has
seen prior to the beginning of the consensus round, that
have not already been applied to the ledger (including
new transactions initiated by end users of the server,
transactions held over from a previous consensus round),
and makes them public in the form of a list known as the
candidate set.
2) Each server then amalgamates the candidate sets of all
servers on its UNL, and votes on the veracity of all
transactions.
3) Transactions that receive more than a minimum percent-
age of yes votes are passed on to the next round, if there
is one, while transactions that do not receive enough votes
will either be discarded, or included in the candidate set
for the next consensus round.
4) The final consensus round requires a minimum percentage
of 80% of a server’s UNL agreeing on a transaction. All
transactions that meet this requirement are applied to the
ledger, and that ledger is closed, becoming the new last-
closed ledger.
A similar process is also followed for validation, albeit with
select servers.
Agreement and forking: Agreement is the property that
ensures that all the nodes agree to the same common version
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of the ledger and thus ensures absence of "forks" in the ledger
where one of two or more different versions of the ledger are
accepted and exist as the "ground truth" for certain subsets of
nodes. The presence of fork(s) results in the double spending
problem. After a formal analysis of the forking criteria, the
relation wu,v ≥ 2(1−ρ) [2] was identified to ensure absence of
forks in the system [2]. Here wu,v is the minimum percentage
UNL overlap between any two nodes and ρ is the threshold of
votes needed for consensus.
In our paper we set up guidelines for the UNL in Ripple.
For this we leverage Kelips [] and its overlay structure and
efficient query routing.
B. Kelips [9] [10]
Kelips is a peer-to-peer (p2p) Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) system with constant time file look-up complexity. For
description purposes we consider a distributed system of N
nodes with the nodes divided into
√
N buckets called affinity
groups of size
√
N each. Each node is associated with a unique
affinity group as determined by a hash function and its hash
parameter.
Each node stores the socket address of all nodes in its
affinity group in home affinity group members list and socket
address of w nodes each for each non-home affinity group in
separate non-home affinity group members list. Additionally, it
also stores file pointers for all files hashed to its affinity group.
Node join: A node undergoes the node join process when it
joins the network. This involves the following steps: (1) The
node identifies its home affinity group. (2) It contacts a well
known introducer for its home affinity group. The introducer
supplies it with a partial or complete home affinity group
members list. Non-home affinity group members lists of size
w nodes each or all nodes it knows in each list. (3) The node
may ask members of its own affinity group and members of
other affinity groups which it knows for their home affinity
groups’ members list. (4) The node intimates all nodes in its
home and non-home affinity group members lists about it’s
presence via broadcast, heart-beat or other mechanism. The
introducer too may intimate its contacts on the new node join.
(5) The node then begins indicating its liveness to other nodes
via a heart beat mechanism at regular intervals, thus helping
nodes keep their contacts list fresh.
III. RELATED WORKS
Ethereum [28] and the cryptocurrencies it has spawned use
Kademlia [17] for peer selection and overlay maintenance for
message passing. Kademlia has O(log(n)) look up complexity,
which cascades to communication for message passing and
for voting in future PoS [5] implementations due to the
requirement of a several round trips. The distance between
peers is virtual distance and not basis actual network topology.
Stakeholders, messages and distances are thus not connected
and aligned in the most efficient possible manner. While one
can start up a node with just one peer, doing so can lead to
inefficiencies in setting up the peer table (which can be circum-
vented by having sufficient peers to start with). Kademlia and
this approach for starting also opens up the possibility of suf-
fering from table poisoning. Thus performance is affected due
to inefficiencies in message passing, dissemination and voting,
and also with scale (with at least O(log(n)) complexities) as
the network grows. It is vulnerable to table poisoning attacks,
overflow attacks and eclipse attacks [6][11][16]. One should
also investigate if it is possible to identify if a malicious node/
account is sending two different sets of messages to different
nodes. Since Ethereum uses PoW and later PoS, Kademlia is
used strictly for peer selection and message passing. We use
Kelips, a more appropriate DHT, in Ripple for not just peer
selection and message passing but also for systematizing the
UNL (collective trust list) for consensus voting and improving
UNL overlap. We thereby provide improvements in speed,
security and last mile connectivity.
Storj [24] uses satellites, a collection of services for data
discovery and maintenance. Discovery can be affected in the
eventuality that the satellite is compromised or malicious. Our/
Kelips’ implementation of introducers is only for discovery and
does not affect decentralisation.
IV. OUR WORK: SISSLE IN CONSENSUS-BASED RIPPLE
Owing to their distributed nature, blockchains also suffer
from the challenge of being able to achieve only two of the
three metrics of an impossible trinity of scale, security, and
decentralization (derivative of the CAP theorem [4]).
We work to improve scale and security at no or negligible
cost to decentralisation. While the introduction of introducers
negligibly or not at all affect decentralisation in a negative
fashion, the automated UNL ensures decentralisation whilst
affecting it positively.
In this section we present our work which results in
improvement of speed, security, last mile connectivity and ease
of use for Ripple and other blockchains. (1) We introduce
network overlay structures inspired by p2p systems. We present
a modified version of the UNL, and introduce two new lists,
the TNL and NML. We describe the behaviour a node is
expected to undertake as it joins the network, is live and active,
and when it leaves the network. We then further describe the
relevant modalities involved in having a dynamic UNL. (2) We
present the proposed modified consensus algorithm. (3) This
is followed by a formal analysis of information propagation,
UNL overlap and consensus thresholds.
A. P2P inspired network overlay for trust and consensus
Guidelines and overlay structure for UNL: Consider a
network overlay in a manner similar to that of Kelips [10]
with N nodes running a consensus algorithm (described later
in this sub-section). There are
√
N affinity groups, each of
size
√
N . Every node can host an introducer and a server
simultaneously. These introducers are publicly known and a list
of them is expected to be maintained by the community. They
individually maintain a Network Members List (NML) which
is a list of socket addresses of all other introducers and servers
in the system and which the server has reason to believe are
live. Note that NML ⊇ UNL. Any node freshly joining the
network connects to one or more introducers to acquire each
introducer’s NML. A server also maintains a Trustee Node List
(TNL) which is a list of all servers that have it in their UNL.
We propose an overall design for the implementation, set
up and updation of UNL, TNL and NML maintained by each
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server. Introducers maintain only the NML. We divide the UNL
maintained by each server into two parts: UNL-A which is a
list of socket addresses of all nodes other than the server, and
belonging to its affinity group. It has a size of
√
N −1. UNL-
B which is a list of socket addresses of c nodes from each of
the other
√
N − 1 affinity groups other than its own affinity
group. It has a size of c ∗ (√N − 1) where ideally c ≥ 3.
All servers in a server’s TNL depend on its proposals/
response towards candidate set generation and consensus. An
optimization towards reduction of chattiness and ensuring
efficient information propagation is that the server sends its
proposals towards candidate set generation and consensus only
to socket addresses in UNL ∪ TNL. UNL and TNL together
are considered as trust lists. A server is connected to all nodes
in its trust lists.
We internally divide the NML into three parts based on
affinity groups: NML-A which is a list of socket addresses of
servers, other than itself, in its affinity group. NML − A ≡
UNL − A. NML-B which is a list of socket addresses of
servers in affinity groups other than its own. NML − B ⊇
UNL − B1. NML-C which is a list of socket addresses of
known introducers for each affinity group.
Whenever a node receives an NML pull request, it responds
with an external version of NML used for sharing purposes.
This version of the NML is divided into two parts: NML-C
which is a list of socket addresses of known introducers for
each affinity group. sNML which is a union of NML-A and
NML-B and is a list of socket addresses of all other servers in
the network. Before a node joins the network, it has a starter
NML (configurable by admin) generally having only NML-C.
Mechanisms for dynamic UNL:
Node behaviour. A non-faulty node (server/ introducer) under
normal execution exists in three states - "Node Join", "Node
Live", "Node Leave". These states and behaviours are the
same for servers and introducers in all states with the key
difference being that in the "Node Live" state, servers have the
consensus protocol running which the introducers don’t. One
must note that if and when a node connects with or sends a
message (including heartbeat) to other nodes, it sends a header
containing its details including affinity group. It also signs this
message via public key cryptography. It does not add a TTL
as that can be utilised to map the network’s connections and
is a security vulnerability. The header is cross-verified at the
recipient node. We now describe the various states in which a
non-faulty node operates under normal execution.
(1) Node Join: When a new node joins the network, it enters
into "Node Join" state and identifies its affinity group. It also
starts building its NML involving several iterations. The node
iteratively sends NML pull requests to all new members of
its NML-A and NML-C in each iteration, and to a total of
c × b new members per affinity group of its NML-B across
1Valid generally always, except around the time when the boundary values
of refresh time periods are reached for both UNL and NML
all iterations2. Additionally it sends NML pull requests to all
nodes from which it has not received a response so far, upto
a maximum d retries. The node adds to its NML the new
nodes identified from the response of its NML pull request.
The configurables obey the conditions, b > 1, c is the same as
that of UNL and d ≥ 5. We assume the time period of each
iteration to be t4 say, which is of the order of magnitude of
each consensus round t1. Once all nodes are contacted and
responses received/ max retries reached and there has been no
change/ addition in NML for 5 iterations, the node then stops
building its NML.
Once the NML is built and if the node A is a server it
starts building its UNL its NML. This involves sending "Trust
Tokens" to all servers in NML-A and to c nodes chosen at
random per affinity group from NML-B. Upon receipt of an
"ACK" from the servers, it includes them into the relevant
sub-parts of UNL. Upon non-receipt of an "ACK", the server
retries sending to those servers upto a maximum of d times.
If a server B from NML-B does not respond despite d retries,
A attempts contacting another randomly chosen server C in
the affinity group of B and not previously contacted by A.
The process continues until all nodes of NML-A have been
contacted and the size of each affinity group in UNL-B is c
or until all nodes in the associated affinity group have been
exhausted with contact attempts and non-receipt of "ACK".
Simultaneously the server also receives "Trust Tokens"
from other servers. It adds these servers into its TNL and sends
an "ACK" response. Finally, once the UNL is built, the node
shifts to "Node Live" state.
(2) Node Live: A server in "Node Live" state participates
in consensus and has liveness protocols running while an
introducer has only liveness protocols running. Servers send
consensus proposals every t1 interval3. As a part of liveness
protocols, each server sends heartbeats to servers in its UNL
and TNL every t2 interval. All nodes including servers send
their NML including liveness timestamps to nodes in their
NML every t3 interval. Here t1 << t2 << t3. Heartbeats sent
by each node have a heartbeat number which is incremented
each time the node sends a new heartbeat to the network.
Additionally, a node dynamically maintains and updates its
UNL, TNL and NML as described later in this sub-section.
(3) Node Leave: When a node decides to shut down or leave
the network under normal circumstances, it sends a "Node
Leave" message with a timestamp to nodes in its NML. This
is forwarded by these nodes to nodes in their UNL/ NML once.
Dynamically maintaining the UNL, TNL and NML. Nodes
implement, maintain and dynamically update their individual
UNL, TNL and NML by leveraging several concepts including
failure detectors, heartbeat, and tombstoning and finally delet-
2If a node B of node A’s NML-B to which an NML pull request has been
sent does not respond even after d retries, the node A stops sending further
NML pull requests to node B. In such a case the node sends an NML pull
request to another node from its NML and in node B’s affinity group, which
has previously not been communicated to if and only if < c nodes have
responded to the NML pull request.
3Multiple rounds of consensus result in the system/ server arriving at
consensus on the newest last closed ledger. Each of these rounds of consensus
takes time t1. (t1 << t2 << t3)
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ing inactive notes. Nodes attempt to establish communication
with nodes which have been tombstoned at regular intervals
and also before deleting them from the respective lists.
A node finds out about another node’s liveness from receipt
of proposals and transactions for candidate set generation
every t1 interval, receipt of heartbeat every t2 interval, and
receipt of NML every t3 interval. Additionally a node may
also find out about another node’s existence upon receipt of
NML pull requests or upon receiving response containing the
node in response to the node’s own pull requests. All received
communication is treated as heartbeat. The receipt of NML is
treated as heartbeat with additional data (NML). Data entries
received in such an NML can be used to update the server’s
own NML if the timestamp of the said entry is greater in
the received NML. The timestamp is also updated with most
recent state related action. The timestamp may be chosen as an
appropriate synchronisation metric such as last closed ledger.
A node present in another node’s lists can be in any of the
four states: State S1 where it is present in at least one trust list
and NML and in a live fashion. State S2 where it is present
in NML and in a live fashion. State S3 where it is present in
NML and in a tombstoned fashion. State S4 Not present in
NML These states are in descending order of liveness.
For a node A containing node B in its lists in appropriate
conditions, node B can transition from State S1 to State S2
in 6 × t1 time from its timestamp, State S2 to State S3 in
t5 ≈ 12× t1 time from its timestamp, State S3 to State S4 in
2× t5 ≈ 24× t1 time from its timestamp. This occurs as the
non-receipt of any communication from the time stamp gives
node A reason to doubt the node B’s liveness. Node B can
however instantly transition from State S4 to State S2 or State
S4 to State S1 or State S3 to State S2 or State S3 to State S1
upon receipt of any communication as it has reason to believe
that the node is live.
Nodes actively try to maintain the size of their UNL-B at
a minimum of c per affinity group and of their NML-B at a
minimum of c× b per affinity group. For NML-B they do so
by querying other appropriate nodes. For UNL-B they do so
by randomly selecting other live nodes (not already in their
UNL-B) from their NML-B and adding them to their UNL-B
upon receipt of "ACK". For sizes smaller than c for specific
affinity groups in NML-B, the UNL-B mirrors the NML-B for
that specific affinity group.
When a node A receives the node leave message of another
node B with an original multicast timestamp for the first
time and B exists in any of A’s UNL, TNL, or NML, then
A immediately deletes B from its UNL, TNL and NML
and forwards the node leave message to other nodes once.
Otherwise it ignores the message and does not forward it.
It must be noted that our concept of UNL-B set up and
maintenance is different from the process of a onetime set up
involving random choice of nodes of other affinity groups from
NML-B; followed by push notifications-based maintenance.
The latter is vulnerable to eclipse and other attacks and is
not truly random (random selection is only done once). It is
possible for the network to converge to some nodes which
keep pinging more, thus losing out on randomisation. Our
approach on the other hand resolves these issues and has
scope to implement randomisation and other algorithms, thus
improving security.
One must note that as is with the original RPCA, a node
can tolerate only a certain threshold/ percentage change in its
UNL over any time period when in "Node Live" state.
B. Modified consensus algorithm:
We propose slight modifications to the consensus algorithm
in terms of information propagation. For all other practical
purposes, the algorithm is the same as the original Ripple
Protocol Consensus Algorithm [22] and the content below is
quoted [22] with some changes.
For each round i of consensus to generate the last closed
ledger at each server, the following steps are taken by the
server:
Stage 1: Candidate set generation
• Transactions in the candidate set which could not pass
the previous consensus round but are still live and valid
are re-included in the candidate set.
• The server flushes it’s transaction queue which contains
various transactions from clients and candidate set trans-
actions of other servers, received previously. These can be
received during the previous consensus round/ currently
received (after the previous transaction flush)/ pending
from the previous queue flush.
• Transactions the server feels are valid and potential can-
didates for consensus are added to the server’s candidate
set.
• The server then declares it’s candidate set to servers in
its UNL (and optionally TNL) once.
• The server also forwards the messages containing can-
didate sets of other servers. It forwards each candidate
set once. It does so by forwarding a set of candidate
sets received in its queue every x seconds. An alternative
approach for scale would be for the server to forward
new candidate transactions it has received and not yet
forwarded as a set every x seconds. This however results
in obfuscating each server’s stand on their candidate set, a
trade-off for further scale and performance. Optimisations
to reduce chattiness can also be employed. We do not
cover the same in this paper.
• In the eventuality of the bandwidth being lesser than
the candidate set/ transaction volume, transactions are
propagated in batches in the descending order of their
processing fee.
• Since transactions involve a processing fee, with greater
priority being given to higher processing fee, attempts
to flood the network with candidate transactions would
cause the erosion of the attacker’s wealth if all the
legitimate transactions have lower transaction value. This
is the best penalty to prevent an attacker from acting
maliciously. However, this might delay processing of
legitimate transactions, and force legitimate transactions
to raise the processing fee they would be willing to pay
for faster processing of transactions. To prevent such a
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situation from arising or sustaining we suggest the usage
of ML and AI agents to identify malicious attempts to
flood the network. Special care should be taken to flag
and identify attempts to raise processing fees in malicious
attacks
• Servers assimilate candidate sets of servers in their UNL
(and optionally TNL) after appropriate vetting of each
transaction. They can also choose to assimilate candidate
sets of other servers after appropriate vetting of each
transaction.
• Let the mandatory wait time for all servers to catch up
and generate/ share their candidate sets in this topology
be y. Then 6 × x ≥ y. This y can be optimised and its
value is an engineering question.
• The mandatory wait time y should be set such that it
ensures at least 3 hops4 of information propagation. All
this ensures that every server has visibility of most/ all of
the transactions across the network.
• Note: This mandatory wait time y is expected to be lesser
than the summation of mandatory wait times it takes in
the current situation and across multiple consensus rounds
for information to propagate. It also speeds up the rate of
achieving consensus as it reduces the unnecessary time
spent over a number of consensus rounds, due to waiting
for the whole network to receive the transaction.
• If some servers still are unable to catch up their sugges-
tions for potential transactions to candidate sets can be
taken up the next round (If this is a large majority, the
time can be tweaked, also the current consensus round
wouldn’t pass). Also, their suggestions and suggestions
they receive get relayed indirectly through the multi-hop
infrastructure.
Stage 2: Consensus sub-rounds
• After the mandatory wait time, the server sends out its
proposals to servers in its TNL (and optionally UNL) for
each sub-round of consensus.
• The server also forwards the messages of proposals from
other servers to servers in its UNL and TNL once per
proposal. It does so by forwarding sets of proposals.
Optimisations to reduce chattiness can also be employed.
We do not cover the same in this paper.
• The absolute threshold for mathematical certainty de-
creases after each sub-round as the number of hops
increases and network overlap due to proposal component
increases.
• The sub-round threshold for elimination of transactions
from the current consensus round increases after each
sub-round, as is there in the Ripple White Paper [22].
However, the threshold need not be more than the absolute
threshold for mathematical certainty.
• For voting and consensus at its own level, the server
considers proposals only from servers in its UNL
4Over the course of this paper, we refer to vertex hops when we utilise the
terminology ’hops’
A similar process is also followed for validation. • Note: The
time for each sub-round can also be optimised and can change/
adapt as per the entire network’s latencies.
C. A Formal Analysis of information propagation, UNL over-
lap and consensus thresholds
In this sub-section, we analyse information propagation
for our suggested approach. We introduce the paradigm of
UNL overlap (and thus thresholds for provable security and
achieving mathematical certainty for the absence of forks) as
a function of information propagation and percentage of non-
byzantine nodes in the UNL.
Information propagation: We present information propa-
gation in a Kelips-like overlay implementing our proposed
approaches and work towards our 3 Hop Claim. As part of
the 3 Hop Claim, we claim that there is a path for information
transfer within 3 hops between any two nodes (i.e. maximum
of 2 degrees of separation5) in the network for a minimum
of < (c + 1) × √N − 1 faults. To prove this claim, We
first present a list of possible paths of length ≤ 3 hops, the
total number of such possible paths and their probability. We
then present a formal mathematical proof of this claim and
back it up with experimental results. We then present how our
approach provides last mile connectivity.
Formal listing of possible paths for information propagation:
We present the same in the tables I. One can observe that there
are ≥ (c2 × √N − 1) + (c × (c − 1)) routes for information
to reach a destination node in the same affinity group as the
source node in 3 hops. Similarly, there are ≥ 2× c× (c+1)×√
N − 2 routes for information to reach a destination node in
an affinity group different from the source node in 3 hops.
In the number of paths, the factor c appears due to a node
accessing a node in it UNL or TNL but not in its affinity group.
The factor containing
√
N occurs when a node accesses one
of the
√
N − 1 other nodes in its own affinity group or one of
the other
√
N − 1 affinity groups. The element ≥ comes from
the fact that the factor c accounts only for nodes in a node’s
UNL and not those in its TNL.
Preventing malicious behaviours: Owing to public key cryp-
tography, a malicious node or set of nodes are limited to behave
maliciously by throttling information. 6 We now demonstrate
how some of the possible malicious behaviours are prevented
by implementing a structured Kelips-like overlay for UNLs.
Some possible malicious behaviours are Malicious behaviour
A which is malicious nodes throttling messages between two
parts of the network, and Malicious behaviour B which is
malicious nodes sending messages to two different parts of
the network and attempting to throttle their propagation across
the two parts
5We define degree of separation as the number of nodes between source
and destination nodes in a path.
6Another way, albiet inconsequential, for a node to behave maliciously in
the face of public key cryptography is to declare erroneous last closed ledger.
However, since that is not the same as a last validated ledger, it does not carry
the same weight and trust. Also, declaring erroneous ledgers diminishes the
node’s reputation and other nodes can choose to ignore it. Thus, it is not only
suicidal but also has no effect and thus not a reasonable attack vector. For this
reason, we do not deem it necessary to discuss it in this paper.
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Table I: A classification of propagation paths paths with source
and destination in same and separate affinity groups
Path No. ofHops
No. of
Paths P(X)
Same affinity group
As → Ad 1 1 1
As → Ai → Ad 2
√
N − 2 1
As → Bi → Ad 2 Probable < 1
As → Bi → Bj → Ad 3 ≥ c2 × (
√
N − 1) 1
As → Bi → Cj → Ad 3 Probable < 1
As → Bi → Aj → Ad 3 ≥ c× (c− 1) 1
As → A1 → . . .
→ Al → Ad l
√
N−2P l 1
Separate affinity groups
As → Bd 1 1 1
As → Aj → Bd 2 ≥ c 1
As → Bi → Bd 2 ≥ c 1
As → Ci → Bd 2 Probable < 1
As → B1 → B2 → Bd 3 ≥ c× (
√
N − 2) 1
As → Ai → Bj → Bd 3 ≥ c× (
√
N − 1) 1
As → Ci → Cj → Bd 3 ≥ c2 × (
√
N − 2) 1
As → Ci → Bk → Bd 3 ≥ c2 × (
√
N − 2) 1
As → Ci → Aj → Bd 3 Probable < 1
As → Ci → Cj
→ Ak → Bd 4 ≥ c
3 × (√N − 2) 1
As → Ci → Cj
→ Bk → Bd 4
≥ c2 × (√N − 1)
×(√N − 2) 1
As → B1 → . . .
→ Bl → Bd l + 1 ≥ c×
√
N−2P l 1
Identification and mitigation of the potential harm due the
malicious behaviours A and B is possible so long as informa-
tion that is attempted to be throttled reaches the destination
nodes (the two parts of the network). We claim that malicious
behaviours A and B can be mitigated by implementing our
proposed approaches. For ease of explanation, we consider one
half of the network to be one node only.
Claim IV-C1 (3 Hop Claim). A node X under attack by
malicious nodes trying to throttle the information flow to and
fro the rest of the network is able to receive and transmit any
information across the whole network within 3 hops as long as
it has at least one genuine and non-faulty node Y in its UNL
or TNL and our proposed approach (Kelips-like overlay and
modified consensus algorithm) is implemented in the presence
of < (c+ 1)× (√N − 1) faults
Proof: Consider a system implementing our proposed
modified consensus algorithm and Kelips-like overlay for
UNLs and thus information propagation. By implementing, the
modified consensus algorithm, information flows freely and
faster than before across nodes and time. One should note that
a message path is bi-directional.
For proving the claim, it would suffice to prove ∃ a path P
containing genuine nodes between a node N of the network
and X via Y (where Y is the only genuine and non-faulty
node connected to X) and its length ≤ 3.
Since the malicious nodes are throttling information and
no path is possible via them, for the purpose of this proof, we
remove them from the graph. All nodes discussed of henceforth
are genuine and non-faulty.
Case 1: If N is in the UNL of X , then N is connected to X .
This means that N is genuine and connected to X which
implies N is Y . This implies ∃ a path N → X of length 1
Table II: Statistics associated with 3 hop claim
N = 256
Malicious Nodes
Eclipsing the
Node
Malicious Nodes
Randomly Throughout
The Network
c = 2
Avg
dist
Avg
% mal
Max
dist
Avg
dist
Avg
% mal
Max
dist
SimC 3.24 7.36 4 3 17.19 3
SimRM 2 17.19 3 2 17.19 2
SimK 2 17.19 3 2 17.19 2
Case 2: If N is not in the UNL of X , then N is not in the
affinity group of X . In such a case two possibilities exist:
(a): N is in the UNL of Y which implies ∃ a path
N → Y → X of length 2. (b): N is not in the UNL of Y .
Given the Kelips-like overlay ∃ a node Ni in affinity group
of N and in the UNL of Y . This implies that ∃ a path
N → Ni → Y → X of length 3
We back this claim with experimental results of experi-
ments run on a 256 node network over 10000 seeded cases.
We measure the maximum of shortest distances between nodes
and the source of information (transaction/ proposal) over the
topology (i.e. implementing the modified consensus algorithm)
for Ripple (SimC), a scaled up version of Ripple (SimRM)
with the number of connections slightly greater than a Kelips-
like overlay, and our proposed approach (SimK) as shown in
table II across two patterns of cases: when malicious nodes
eclipse a node and when malicious nodes are distributed
randomly and evenly all across the network with the number
of malicious nodes < (c+1)× (√N − 1). In the simulations,
malicious nodes attempt to throttle information flow by not
forwarding any information they receive, and successful cases
are those where all the genuine nodes receive the information.
Experimentally, it is observed that the maximum of shortest
distances between nodes and the source of information reaches
a maximum of 3 for SimK while it reaches a maximum of 4
for SimC and information reaches all nodes while the average
number of malicious nodes < (c+1)×(√N−1). Maximum of
shortest distance has been observed to be > 3 for only SimC
in 1175/5000 cases arising when a particular node is eclipsed
by all but one malicious node.
We observe the maximum of shortest distance ≤ 3 with
100% success7 for SimK, if • the total percentage of malicious
nodes in the network ≤ 80 for c = 2 with malicious nodes
distributed randomly, or • the total percentage of malicious
nodes in the network ≤ 28 for c = 2 with any particular node
eclipsed with all but one connected node being malicious.
Ensuring last mile connectivity: Building upon Claim IV-C1,
we can say that if a server with poor connectivity and at
a last mile location is able to connect to one other server/
one non-faulty server, it’s message gets relayed to the entire
network in 3 hops and the whole system will reach consensus
and validation on that transaction. The server can then receive
the last validated ledger from that link and thus the server
while not receiving proposals acts as a relay of transactions
and also receives latest updates on the last/ latest validated
ledger. This way, we can ensure last mile connectivity. The
same was previously not guaranteed to happen. Thus, with
our approach, we increase the connectedness of the graph.
7this metric including distance criteria is also known as Success2
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Information propagation, UNL overlap and consensus
threshold: If a node can send out information, then the whole
network will receive it in three hops. If the node is not able to
send out information and is eclipsed, then the whole network
will not receive it in three hops. If such a situation arises,
the node can work to come out of being eclipsed if it is
able to identify the situation via avenues including censorship
detection [26]. Either way, the whole network receives the
same information and thus is in a consistent state. This is true
for both candidate sets and proposals. To prevent eclipse type
attacks, we suggest efficient random selection from the NML.
One can additionally design the server’s UNL selection process
such that it verifies another server’s track record as maintained
by the community in terms of statistics before considering it
for its UNL. Thus information propagation and receipt is the
biggest tool that we address in our paper.
Even in the case of ≥ (c+1)×√N − 1 malicious nodes,
which in the current case is ≥ 124 nodes, it is highly unlikely
that all eclipse one particular node, given randomisation. One
may also note that c is adjustable and it’s value can be
increased further. Also, the minimum suggested number of
124 is far more than the number of nodes some servers are
connected to at this day. Therefore, the chances of being
eclipsed decrease significantly when using our approach.
In the current context of manually maintaining UNLs, it is
envisioned [14] that over time the community and its members
will keep a track of nodes and their behaviour. The user is
free to consider the track records as maintained by different
members and select the most appropriate one.
By utilising the relation between UNL overlap and consen-
sus threshold [2], it suffices to say that if there is an increase
in UNL overlap, the minimum threshold needed for arriving
at consensus can be further reduced, thus decreasing the time
taken to reach consensus. It can be noted that for a 90% overlap
in UNL, we can work with as little as 55% threshold. 8
Key arguments connecting overlap with information propaga-
tion and percentage byzantine nodes: Two servers are said to
be the same if they receive the same information (candidate
sets and proposals) and behave similarly (send proposals to
the same transactions).
Assume two good (non-malicious) nodes A and B in UNLs
of nodes α and β respectively. If node B receives all candidate
set transactions and proposals received by A and forwards the
same over as A. Then for all practical purposes B is the same
as A. Thus α and β have an overlap in A and B.
If all nodes have the latest information, and α has f1
good nodes in its UNL of size N1 and β has f2 good
nodes in its UNL of size N2, then overlap between α and
β is ≥ min( f1N1 ,
f2
N2
). This can be extrapolated for the whole
network. Thus threshold for provable security and achieving
mathematical certainty for the absence of forks is ≤ 1 −
min(
f1
N1
,
f2
N2
,..., fnNn )
2 . If all nodes are good, then one can achieve
overlap levels of 100%. In such a case the threshold for
8The minimum 66% threshold is valid in the classical byzantine generals
problem. In the case of implementing public key cryptography to the problem,
we can go as low as > 50% overlap
achieving consensus would be as low as (50 + )% where
 is a negligible positive value.
Thus, we can say that UNL overlap is a function of
information propagation (candidate set and proposal propa-
gation) and the percentage of non-byzantine nodes in UNLs.
The associated consensus thresholds which are a function of
overlap can also decrease as the information gets propagated
with time. If sufficient wait time is given to the network to
propagate the candidate set and to propagate proposals so as
to achieve 100% information propagation, then UNL overlap
becomes purely a function of the percentage of non-byzantine
nodes in UNLs. These optimal wait times can be found out
experimentally on the network or basis analysis of appropriate
network characteristics (latencies) and the specifics of the
affinity group membership.
A node should not share information about its UNL and
the number of nodes it believes are non-byzantine in nature to
prevent eclipse and other attacks. Owing to this consideration,
it is not feasible to find the overlap with other nodes and a
more practical way to calculate thresholds needs to be looked
at. We leverage the fact that the community or the individual
node is expected maintain a track record of nodes and their
behaviour and that the UNL of a node is expected set up
such that nodes in the UNL collectively do not defraud the it.
Since the users are free to choose which community member’s
records to trust or to maintain own records, such a system
can be considered a loosely coupled system. Thus, a node
can compute the ’reputation’ or trust value of each node in it
UNL and the level of trust or confidence it has in its UNL. If
information propagation is 100% and all nodes have received
the same information across the whole network, the ’UNL
overlap’ and thus threshold for achieving consensus can be
considered purely a function of the non-byzantine nature of
nodes in a node’s UNL9 and thus can be computed using the
percentage of non-byzantine nodes or the trust value a node
assigns to its own UNL. A node admin can set a minimum
trust value the node should maintain for its UNL and thus
lower or raise the thresholds for achieving consensus.
Our approach is more scalable compared to hard overlap.
For hard overlap, UNL size is O(N), while our approach
requires much smaller UNL size. In a Kelips specific overlay,
we see UNL sizes of O(
√
N). Thus, owing to our research, a
node’s overlap with the whole network is bound to be better
and more scalable, with a more systematized way of UNL
selection and information propagation improving the overlap
and providing network exposure.
Irrespective of our research, from a safety stand point,
we suggest that one depend on last validated ledger for
transactions of large amounts while for smaller amounts, one
can depend on either the last closed ledger or the last validated
ledger based upon whether one is willing to wait for a few
more seconds for the last validated ledger.
9This is a consideration at each individual node level as opposed to at
network level
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V. SIMULATION
A. Experimental setup
We run a variety of seeded test cases for each simulation
for a 256-node network. We build upon the simulation code
’Sim.cpp’ [8] mentioned in the Ripple White Paper [22]. At
the onset of each simulated case, information originates at
a random source node while all other nodes are unaware of
it. For subsequent information propagation we simulate only
for valid transactions. An invalid transaction originating at a
source node is not forwarded by the other genuine nodes and it
thus dies down immediately. 10 Meanwhile, a valid transaction
is forwarded by all genuine nodes that receive it. All malicious
nodes attempt to throttle such a transaction’s propagation by
not forwarding it. We do so by simulating the throttling of
transactions, which is the worst possible malicious behaviour
a node can demonstrate for any transaction that uses public
key cryptography. Since the simulation is at a transaction and
proposal level11, a lesser malicious behaviour where malicious
nodes partially throttle information and/ or selectively throttle
information is still possible for other transactions.
For a node to arrive at a consensus on the transaction, at
least 80% of its UNL has to agree on it in SimC and SimRM,
while this threshold is varied and graded over time (and
thus information overlap) for SimK, our proposed approach.
Finally, the simulation verifies that the system comes to a right
consensus or if all genuine nodes have received the information
depending on the simulation mode chosen. Several appropriate
success metrics (not achieving which is failure) have been
incorporated into the system and discussed with the possible
simulation modes in Section V.
In our simulator we make several improvements vis-a-vis
’Sim.cpp’[8] which has some flaws including: • The starting
condition that the network has 50% nodes voting in favor of
a transaction and 50% nodes voting against it is not exactly
accurate as it does not represent information propagation
across the network that influences the starting state. • State
change starts at each node as soon as the node receives
votes corresponding to a minimum percentage threshold of
nodes which is set to be 50% of smallest UNL size while
the threshold for consensus, which is a property of a node
is erroneously applied to the whole network as a success
metric. • The simulator only proves that the system comes
to a ’consensus’ as opposed to a right consensus.
We now describe the 3 different versions of the system
used for comparison12: (1) SimC[x][y]: Sim-Classic (or SimC)
represents the current state of RippleNet and is made from the
original version of Sim.cpp. The size and selection procedure
of UNL, the number of links, link latencies and connections
remain same as the original ’Sim.cpp’. (2) SimRM[x][y]: Sim-
RippleMid (or SimRM) is a modified version of SimC[x][y]
with the size of UNL and number of links scaled to be slightly
greater than SimK[x], described below. The UNL selection
procedure, link latencies and connections is randomised as is
in SimC[x][y]. It represents a system having a randomised
10While this is valid only for our proposed approach SimK, we extend it
to the current approach by Ripple, SimC for comparison purposes.
11We simulate for ’a’ transaction which can be extended to ’all’ transactions
12[x] represents the mode and is always present. [y] represents percent-
ageEclipsed and is present if applicable
topology with a similar UNL size and number of links as
SimK. (3) SimK[x][y]: Sim-Kelips or (SimK) represents a
system where the UNL membership and network topology is
inspired by Kelips. The UNL, number of links, connections
are set up in line with the approach described in the paper
while link latencies are the same as is with SimC[x][y].
We have various configurables across the different system
simulations: • mode: The mode in which simulation is being
run. Half of them are associated with information propaga-
tion, while the remaining are associated with consensus. The
different modes are:
mode 1 measures consensus at a network level. Success
is achieved when the number of nodes arriving at the right
consensus is ≥ min(genuine nodes, number of nodes corre-
sponding to Network_Consensus_Percent). mode 2 measures
the information propagation at a network level. Success is
achieved when the number of nodes that have received infor-
mation ≥ min(genuine nodes, number of nodes corresponding
to Network_Consensus_Percent). mode 3 measures consensus
at a network level and at a specific target node. Success metrics
include those for mode 1 and also ensures the target node
has also come to the consensus. mode 4 which measures the
propagation of information to a specific target node. mode 5
extends mode 3 with the target node is partially eclipsed by
malicious nodes in its UNL. Success metric same as mode 3.
mode 6 extends mode 4 with the target node partially eclipsed
by malicious nodes in its UNL. mode 8 which measures the
maximum of shortest distance nodes have from the source node
initiating the transaction, when a particular target node is par-
tially eclipsed by malicious nodes upto ’percentageEclipsed’
nodes in its links (connections). Success1 is achieved when
all the genuine nodes have received information by the time
message passing has ended, Success2 is achieved when all the
genuine nodes have received information by the time message
passing has ended and the maximum of shortest distance ≤ 3 •
Network_Consensus_Percent: The network wide percentage
which is one of the factors of a minimum function to be
achieved for achieving success. Not valid for modes 4, 6 and 8
• percentage_malicious: Percentage of nodes in the network
to be made malicious and distributed in a random fashion.
It does not include nodes which eclipse target nodes. • out-
bound_links_to_node_ratio: Ratio representing the number
of outbound links per node to the number of nodes. Applicable
on ly for SimC. Unless otherwise mentioned, we consider its
value to be 10/256 which is higher than the current ratio which
is approximately 15/1024 in a non-randomised topology. As
the outbound links to node ratio decreases, the graph becomes
sparser, and the performance of SimC reduces as the quality
of information propagation decreases while the chances of
failure in consensus increases. Thus, the actual performance
of RippleNet in a randomised topology is worse than the
performance seen in simulations. Therefore, the actual benefits
of our approach vis-a-vis a randomised RippleNet topology is
more than that seen in the experiments. • minLatencyFactor-
ForNI and maxLatencyFactorForNI: Minimum (inclusive)
and maximum (exclusive) factors affecting links and their
latencies affected by Network Issues. The factors are over a
uniform real number distribution. • percentNodesAffected-
ByNI: Percentage of nodes affected by Network Issues. • per-
centLinksAffectedByNI: Percentage of links affected of each
node affected by Network Issues. • percentageEclipsed: The
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Figure 1: Sub-figures ((a)), ((d)) compare information propagation for baseline cases (percent_malicious = 0) and
percent_malicious cases in the absence of network issues for mode 2. Sub-figures ((b)), ((e)) compares consensus for baseline
cases (percent_malicious = 0) and percent_malicious cases in the absence of network issues for mode 1. Sub-figures ((c)), ((f))
compare consensus for percent_malicious = 0 , percentLinksAffectedByNI = 75, percentNodesAffectedByNI = 100,
Network_Consensus_Percent = 100 and mode 1.
percentage of nodes on the other side of links or in the UNL13,
whichever is applicable, of the test node are maliciously
eclipsing it. (Applicable for modes 5, 6 and 8) • seedMax: The
number of seeded cases being run. Unless otherwise mentioned
seedMax is 1500 for odd modes and 5000 for even modes.
• UNL_B_PER_AFFINITY_SUBGROUP_SIZE: Variable c
in UNL-B size as in our paper. For simulations c = 2 .
While interpreting the graphs, one should note that all
values have a natural and expected non-negative range. The
presence of negative value for any particular data point in the
graphs is an indicator that all test cases associated with that
data point have ended in failure.
In our simulations, malicious nodes do not add/ declare
transactions in their own last closed ledger and hence do
not declare consensus on the transactions. Thus, only gen-
uine nodes come to a consensus. In the eventuality, if the
Network_Consensus_Percent is greater than actual percentage
of genuine nodes, then the Network_Consensus_Percent is set
as the actual percentage of genuine nodes.
It is possible that the percentage of malicious nodes in UNL
13Eclipse node via Malicious UNL for modes 5 and 6, and Eclipse node
via Malicious Links for mode 8
can be greater than percentage_malicious nodes in the network.
Additionally, as conditions get severe, there can be breakages
in the network and malicious nodes design becomes such that
a node might be 100% eclipsed for information propagation, or
> 50% for consensus or some other issues. In such a situation
it may not be possible to have information and consensus at
100% of the nodes. Thus while SimK, though better than
SimC, is not able to achieve 100% success in consensus in
very poor conditions.
B. Results and interpretations
Degrees of severity: Degrees of severity are chosen basis
simulations shown in Figure 1, observations of real world
statistics [27] and are tabulated in Table III.
Information Propagation: Figures 1, 2 provide a comparative
view of average time and percentage successful cases and cover
mode 2, 4 and 6 associated with information propagation,
under different cases. It may be noted: SimK consistently
performs better than SimRM and SimC. By the time 20% of
RippleNet receives information 100% of our system receives
information. Every case of information propagation delay or
failure, is an opportunity for creating a fork, or for impairing
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Figure 2: Subfigures ((a)), ((d)) compare information propagation for baseline cases percent_malicious = 0 , Ideal condition,
Network_Consensus_Percent corresponding to comparison cases’ Network_Consensus_Percent and cases of corresponding
severity for mode 2. Subfigures ((b)), ((e)) compare for modes 4 and 6 across varying severity. Subfigures ((c)), ((f)): compare
for mode 6 across varying percentageEclipsed for Real World severity.
Table III: Factors associated with varying degrees of severity
Severity
(Severity Num) Ideal(0)
Real
World
(1)
Mild
(2)
Moderate-
Severe
(3)
Very
Severe
(4)
% Malicious Nodes 0 20 40 60 80
Min Latency Factor
(Network Issue) 0 1.5 3 4.5 6.5
Max Latency Factor
(Network Issue) 0 2 3.5 5 7
% Links Affected
(Network Issue) 0 25 50 75 75
% Nodes Affected
(Network Issue) 100 100 100 100 100
Network Consensus
Percent (%
Genuine Nodes)
100 80 60 40 20
the consensus of a transaction. Thus, SimK improves security
along with transaction speed.
Figure 3 provides a comparative view of percentage
successful2 cases and average percentage malicious nodes
with mode 8. SimK performs significantly better than SimC.
As the percentage malicious nodes is very slightly higher
for SimK as compared to SimRM, SimK performs extremely
slightly poorer. However, since there are several possible and
faster paths in SimK, it performs better as demonstrated in
other simulations associated with information propagation.
Consensus: Figures 1, ??, 3 provide a comparative view
of average time and percentage successful cases and cover
mode 1, 3 and 5 associated with consensus, under different
cases. It may be noted that SimK consistently performs better
than SimRM and SimC. Every case of consensus failure is
a possibility of genuine transactions getting stuck and forcing
failed retries. Not only does this consume resources, it reduces
the utility and adoptability of the system. There is lesser
possibility of consensus failure in our implementation SimK
over SimC and thus a lesser opportunity for an attacker to stall
or affect the system.
Other Key Results: Implementing SimK results in lesser
time and messages. The complexity of sent SimK messages
is a maximum 2x SimC and lesser than SimRB. However,
considering received messages, SimK’s success in significantly
lesser received messages than SimC and SimRB. Thus, SimK
has higher order of success. There are an average 5120, 18240
and 18432 links in SimC, SimK and SimRM respectively.
C. Limitations and Future Work
• The UNL can be further tuned to take full benefit
of the underlying internet’s overlay graph by appropriately
choosing the affinity group’s membership criteria. Efficient
membership criteria for affinity groups is out of the scope of
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Figure 3: Sub-figures ((a)), ((d)) compare information propagation for mode 8. Sub-figure ((b)), ((e)) compare consensus for
baseline cases percent_malicious = 0, Ideal condition, Network_Consensus_Percent corresponding to comparison cases’
Network_Consensus_Percent and cases of corresponding severity for mode 1. Subfigure ((c)), ((f)): compare consensus for
baseline cases percent_malicious = 0, Ideal condition, Network_Consensus_Percent corresponding to comparison cases’
Network_Consensus_Percent and cases of corresponding severity for mode 5(15).
this paper and is the subject of our ongoing research. • A more
detailed methodology towards calculating and maintaining the
trust value of UNLs at a node and network level, and also
avoiding and preventing various attack vectors via multiple
avenues including randomisation and membership algorithms
for UNLs, detection, and reputation management in a loosely
coupled system is out of scope of this paper and the subject of
our ongoing research. • Optimisations to reduce chattiness in
the context of our modified consensus algorithm can be further
looked upon while implementing it and are not covered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our approaches and design are inherently generic and are
applicable to other cryptocurrencies and systems. Aimed at
systematising UNL overlap and generation and implementation
of efficient message propagation and consensus, introducing
dynamic maintenance for UNLs, and further improving the
RPCA, and introducing consensus thresholds as a function
of information propagation and percentage of non-byzantine
nodes in the UNL, our paper explores and opens these concepts
with protection against attacks and vulnerabilities. It thus has
potential to bring about the benefits such as reduced thresholds,
increased speed, improved and systematized security, last mile
connectivity, resilience to byzantine, sybil and eclipse attacks,
load balancing, increased ease of use and assured 2 degrees
of separation. These improvements to consensus ensure that a
more energy efficient and sybil resilient approach as compared
to Proof of Work is promoted. Applicable to other systems,
their implementers can additionally choose to incorporate
features to perform network diagnostics such as connection
detection, network state and latency analysis. One must note
that these additional implementations can reduce secrecy and
can open the system to attack vectors. The decision is thus left
to the implementers of these systems.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Goals and Challenges of Distributed Payment Systems
Owing to their distributed nature, blockchains also suffer
from the challenge of being able to achieve only two of the
three metrics of an impossible trinity of scale, security, and
decentralization (derivative of the CAP theorem [4]).
In this paper we work to improve scale and security at no
or negligible cost to decentralisation. While the introduction of
introducers negligibly or not at all affect decentralisation in a
negative fashion, the automated UNL ensures decentralisation
whilst affecting it positively.
Goals of Distributed Payments Systems Some of the goals
and areas of work in RTGSs, Distributed Payment Systems and
allied systems (in general), needed towards their widespread
adoption and success include improvement of utility by
1) improving the transaction speed without compromising on
security (with the same or similar levels of certainty)
2) having in place highly resilient and provably secure sys-
tems with reasonably comfortable consensus and safety
thresholds that are not prone to network partitioning and
blockchain forks.
3) improving last mile connectivity (thus being able to conduct
transactions even in relatively poor connectivity areas).
The Hazards of Network Partitions and Blockchain Forks
Network partitions and blockchain forks are detrimental to
systems because forks detected and resolved post the com-
pletion of transactions open the system to Double Spend
attacks (illegitimate transactions). It is often resolved by hard
forks with legitimate transactions on the discarded forks being
invalidated.
Failure to achieve the consensus threshold’s lower bounds
results in invalidation and rejection of the transaction. Some
of the reasons for this failure include:
1) Not enough trusted members participating in consensus
agreeing (voting positively) on the transaction as they did
not deem it valid.
2) Non-receipt of transactions due to network issues (latency,
DDoS and Eclipse attacks, flux and churn, message
throttling, etc), which can lead to network partitioning,
blockchain forks and double spend attacks.
Rejection of transactions and thus prevention of the
blockchain’s forward movement in a potentially unhealthy
network situation prevents potential blockchain forks and
double spend attacks. However this contains a flaw – forward
movement is prevented merely on the possibility or suspicion
of a network partition and not just when the network truly
undergoes partitioning. It thus affects the normal functioning
and brings to a halt all legitimate transactions and financial ac-
tivities, dependent systems which have adopted and integrated
with it, partially or fully. Thus it has a negative impact on real
life human activities and though relatively safer, is still a loss
making situation in itself.
The above mentioned challenges undermine systems open
to them by undermining their reliability and the trust in
them, questioning their very veracity. They raise adoption and
viability concerns causing potential loss of new and existing
members and reduction in transaction volume. One should thus
be mindful of the above challenges and various security con-
siderations and also ensure that normal operations and activity
is not impacted by false positives, while designing systems.
Engineering and research work going on to make systems
secure, fast, fault and partition tolerant thus is of importance
and needed to ensure trust and widespread adoption.
Solving for Distributed Payments Systems, and in general
As one can see, the absence of an appropriate consensus
process and the possibility of network partitioning or a delay in
information propagation can be extremely detrimental. There
is a need for
• a consensus algorithm that prevents such vulnerabilities
• an information propagation mechanism that ensures ma-
licious nodes are unable to prevent the network from
making forward progress and unable to cause network
partitioning and forks in the system.
In our work, we have tried to fulfill these needs and
gaps and worked towards achieving the goals associated with
distributed payments systems mentioned above. We present
guidelines to implement and set up Ripple’s UNL, introduce
newer lists and constructs, setting a base network overlay
structure for assured overlap and efficient information propa-
gation (in generic and randomised network topology). We also
outline various node behaviours, present a modified consensus
algorithm. We back this with sound analysis and experimental
data and bring about improvements as outlined in the previous
section and also later in the paper, including in areas such as
performance, security, utility, thereby impacting adoption. We
also provide methods to automate UNL updation.
It may be noted that since the network topology on top of
which the UNL and other constructs is implemented is generic
per se, the UNL and other construct’s implementation too is
generic. Our work is applicable not just to Ripple, a representa-
tive cryptocurrency and distributed payments system but to all
other RTGSs, distrbuted payments systems, cryptocurrencies
and to some problems faced as a part of the Byzantine Generals
Problem
B. The mechanics and percentage of information propagation
As part of this subsection, we represent assured propagation
routes from a source node to destination node in the same
affinity group. More routes, similar or otherwise might be
possible. For source and destination nodes in separate affinity
groups, a similar approach can be followed.
As shown in figure 4, the information propagates to all
nodes in the source node’s UNL. (c+1)×(
√
N−1)×100
N % of
the network receives the information as a best case scenario,
including the destination node. 14
14These (c+1)×(√N−1) nodes are the single biggest vulnerabilities for
throttling any information to and fro nodes. As long as information reaches
any one of these nodes, information is likely to reach the rest of the network
as shown later
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Figure 4: Propagation in 1 Hop: Source and Destination in
Same Affinity Group
Figure 5: Propagation in 2 Hops: Source and Destination in
Same Affinity Group
In case the destination node does not receive the informa-
tion directly in one hop, it receives the same via two hops
through all other nodes in its affinity group, as shown in
figure 5. These are assured mechanisms. It might be possible
that the source and destination node share common nodes as
connections in other affinity groups. As a best case scenario,
100% of nodes in the network receive the information within
two hops.
Figure 6: Propagation in 3 Hops: Source and Destination in
Same Affinity Group
In case the destination node still does not receive infor-
mation within two hops, it receives the same in three hops
via the routes depicted in the figure 6 and other routes. It is
guaranteed that 100% of the network receives the information
in the absence of ≥ (c+ 1)× (√N − 1) failures.
Figure 7: Source and Destination in Separate Affinity Groups
This ensures a distance of 3 hops (maximum 2 degrees of
separation) between any two nodes in the absence of ≥ (c +
1)×(√N−1) failures. For the presence of ≥ (c+1)×(√N−1)
failures, a node is either uneclipsed, partially eclipsed, fully
eclipsed. If a node is uneclipsed or partially eclipsed, it is
still able to send and receive all information from the network
including the last validated ledger. If a node is fully eclipsed
and it is no longer a part of the network and not participating
in the consensus process and not associated with any genuine
nodes. A node admin should identify such a situation (existing
means are censorship detectors [26]) and rectify it.
C. Other configurables
Other configurables other than those mentioned earlier
include: • UNLA_LLF_MAX, UNLB_LLF_MAX: The max-
imum link latency factor15(LLF) for links associated with
UNLA and UNLB for SimK and a similar association for
links in SimRB. All associated permutations computed us-
ing these levers. • upperLimitMalicious: The upper limit
(exclusive) of the number of malicious nodes in the system.
Corresponds to (c + 1) × (√N − 1). Only applicable for
mode 8. • isUpperLimitMaliciousApplicable: Boolean value
ensuring applicability of upperLimitMalicious. Only applicable
for mode = 8. • num_nodes: Number of nodes in the network.
Unless otherwise mentioned, num_nodes is 256.
D. Additional Graphs
Information Propagation Figures 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
Consensus Figures 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
15Latencies of links and thus the ratio of link latencies for links within
and outside affinity groups can be varied by a factor equal to the link latency
factor. Specific link latency factors are represented by {k, l} with k and l
being link latency factor for UNLA and UNLB respectively. Applicable for
SimRB and SimK. A similar nomenclature if used for SimC is applicable only
k = l.
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Figure 8: (Information Propagation) Comparison of data points for baseline cases (percent_malicious = 0) and per-
cent_malicious cases in the absence of network issues for mode 2
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Figure 9: (Information Propagation) Comparison of data points for baseline cases (percent_malicious = 0 , Ideal condition,
Network_Consensus_Percent corresponding to comparison cases’ Network_Consensus_Percent) and cases of corresponding
severity for mode 2
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Figure 10: (Information Propagation) Comparison of data points for modes 4 and 6 across varying severity
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Figure 11: (Information Propagation) Comparison of data points for mode 6 across varying percentageEclipsed for Real World
severity
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Figure 12: (Information Propagation) Comparison of data points for mode 8.
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Figure 13: (Consensus) Comparison of data points for baseline cases (percent_malicious = 0 , Ideal condition, Net-
work_Consensus_Percent corresponding to comparison cases’ Network_Consensus_Percent) and cases of corresponding severity
for mode 1
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Figure 14: (Consensus) Comparison of data points for percent_malicious = 0 , percentLinksAffectedByNI = 75,
percentNodesAffectedByNI = 100, Network_Consensus_Percent = 100 and mode 1
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Figure 15: (Consensus) Comparison of Avg Time, Avg Sent Messages and Avg Received Messages for SimK, SimRM and
SimC for varying UNL-A and UNL-B Link Latency Factors (Condition: Ideal Severity, 0% percentage_malicious, 100%
Network_Consensus_Percent) for mode 1.
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Figure 16: (Consensus) Comparison of data points for baseline cases (percent_malicious = 0) and percent_malicious cases in
the absence of network issues for mode 1.
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Figure 17: (Consensus) Comparison of Avg Time and Percent Successful Cases for baseline cases (percent_malicious = 0
, Ideal condition, Network_Consensus_Percent corresponding to comparison cases’ Network_Consensus_Percent) and cases of
corresponding severity for mode 5
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